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A Two Hundred-Year Statistical History of the 
Gerrymander 
STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE† & MAXWELL PALMER‡ 
In this Article we assess the geographic compactness of every 
congressional district used across U.S. history. Using the original 
gerrymander as a standard and a variety of compactness measures, 
we assess changes in geographic gerrymandering over time and 
analyze the effect of key voting rights laws and court cases on 
compactness. We find that approximately 20% of all districts are less 
compact than the original gerrymander. This pattern has been fairly 
steady over the past 200 years but has worsened since the 1960s. We 
also show a strong relationship between non-compact districts and 
Democratic vote share in congressional elections; Democratic 
districts tend to be less compact than Republican districts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Geographic compactness of legislative districts has long served as a way 
to identify where mapmakers have manipulated district boundaries to favor 
one interest, social group, or political party over others. Most states today have 
some form of compactness criterion, down to legislation of the use of specific 
formulas for assessing compactness.1 At the federal level, the Apportionment 
Act of 1911 states that congressional districts are to consist of “contiguous and 
                                                                                                                     
  This Article was presented at the Congress and History Conference at Vanderbilt 
University on May 22–23, 2015. 
 † Professor of Government at Harvard University. 
 ‡ Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University. 
 1 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 483, 529 (1993). 
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compact territory,”2 though that language was eventually dropped in the 
Apportionment Act of 1929.3 While compactness may itself be a desirable 
feature of districts (say, because it minimizes travel time), significant 
deviations from compactness are taken as indicative of other forms of political 
manipulation of election laws, such as favoring one of the political parties or 
interfering with the representation of one social group or interest.4 
How closely districts comport with this standard, then, is informative 
about the extent to which states comply with these broad districting principles, 
and it is a key piece of evidence in detecting political manipulation of 
legislative boundaries. This Article presents an historical assessment of the 
geographic compactness of all congressional districts from the first Congress 
to the present. We do so with an eye toward three specific questions regarding 
compactness as a stand alone districting principle and as an indicator of other 
sorts of manipulations. First, how compact are districts compared with a 
standard of what constitutes a non-compact boundary? Second, is compactness 
indicative of racial gerrymanders? Third, is compactness indicative of partisan 
gerrymanders? 
In offering this assessment, we introduce a standard for what constitutes a 
minimum acceptable level of compactness. Generally, there exists no accepted 
statistical or legal standard for measuring whether a district is non-compact.5 
The legal literature on legislative districting has generally sought such a 
standard but usually gets no further than a subjective assessment of ugliness.6 
Pildes and Niemi offer a comparison of the compactness of every U.S. House 
district drawn during the 1991–1992 redistricting cycle.7 Their analysis offers 
an enlightening comparison of the compactness of various districts in that 
cycle of apportionment, but it offers no metric against which to measure 
whether a district was unusually misshapen.8 How bad is bad? We invoke an 
historical standard that has become synonymous with political manipulation of 
legislative district boundaries: the shape of the 1812 Massachusetts Senate 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Apportionment Act of 1911, Pub. L. No. 5, 37 Stat. 13, 14 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 3 
(1935)). 
 3 Permanent Apportionment Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 13, 46 Stat. 21, 26 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012)). 
 4 For a general discussion of districting principles and practices, see generally DAVID 
BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (1992), and JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A 
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING (2010).  
 5 See Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a 
Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 
1157 (1990). 
 6 See generally Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: 
Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 301 (1991) (discussing contiguity, compactness, and shapes as standards for 
determining whether a district has been gerrymandered). 
 7 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 530–31, 571–73. 
 8 See generally id. 
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district, the Gerrymander.9 If there is a district whose shape defines a 
gerrymander, it is the original beast itself. 
We compare the compactness of every congressional district in U.S. 
history against the shape of the original gerrymander. One in five 
congressional districts, 20% of all districts ever drawn, are less compact than 
the original gerrymander. That frequency of non-compact districts has 
increased somewhat since the mid-1960s. Twin federal actions dramatically 
altered the practice of districting. First, in 1964, the Supreme Court required 
extensive redrawing of districts to comply with the standard of one-person-
one-vote.10 Second, beginning in the 1970s, the Federal Voting Rights Act 
compelled creation of minority districts.11 Both requirements are thought to 
have contributed to the growing distortion of legislative district boundaries.12 
It is difficult to say what one would expect if, say, districts were drawn 
arbitrarily,13 however the high rate of non-compactness historically—20% of 
all congressional districts—suggests that states typically do not comport with 
the most basic standards of compactness when drawing district boundaries. 
Other factors might have contributed to the increasing distortion of district 
boundaries, including the introduction of computerized districting and the 
increased partisan rancor in U.S. politics.14 
Interestingly, the compactness of the original gerrymander suggests a 
readily acceptable standard for measuring and assessing the compactness of 
legislative districts. Existing measures of district compactness have different 
scales and “ideal districts” that must be understood to interpret a particular 
compactness result.15 For example, with the Reock measure, a perfectly 
circular district receives a score of “1,” a perfect square receives a score of 
“0.64,” and less compact districts receive smaller scores.16 With the 
Schwartzberg perimeter measure, a perfect circle receives a score of “1,” and 
less compact districts receive higher scores.17 With other measures, such as the 
ratio of the district area to the perimeter, there is no “ideal” district shape to 
                                                                                                                     
 9 See ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 62–
77 (1907); see also infra Part III. 
 10 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–71 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1, 7–9 (1964). 
 11 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 486. 
 12 STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE 
PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 241–44 (2008). 
 13 See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political 
Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 239–42 (2013) 
(measuring the effects of geography on compactness and “unintentional gerrymandering”). 
 14 See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 496–97, 574. 
 15 See generally H.P. Young, Measuring the Compactness of Legislative Districts, 13 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 105 (1988) (examining the eight most commonly used measures of 
compactness). 
 16 See id. at 106. 
 17 Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of 
“Compactness,” 50 MINN. L. REV. 443, 444 (1966). 
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use as a benchmark; districts are only assessed relative to each other.18 Here, 
we propose that the original gerrymander be the standard for measuring 
district compactness for all measures. We adjust and scale every measure such 
that the compactness score of the original gerrymander is always “1,” higher 
scores are less compact, and lower scores are more compact.  
This standardizing approach offers four distinct advantages. First, all 
measures, regardless of how they are calculated, are interpreted in the same 
way and on the same scale. This makes it easier to understand what a 
compactness measure means relative to an established baseline. Second, we 
can more easily compare different measures of the same district. A district 
may be non-compact on one measure but compact on another. The common 
scale allows for direct comparisons between these measures. Third, we have a 
clear reference district that is well known and easy to visualize. When we say a 
district scores “1.25” on a given measure, we can interpret that to mean, “This 
district is 25% worse than the original gerrymander.” Fourth, we can use the 
score of the original gerrymander as a cutoff for identifying unambiguous 
gerrymanders. If a district is worse than the original gerrymander across some 
set of measures, we can classify it as a gerrymander as well.  
Compactness itself may not be of great concern. Rather, non-compactness 
is usually a red flag. It indicates that something unusual happened to district 
boundaries and suggests that districts may have been drawn to favor one social 
group or political party.19 Specifically, non-compactness is often taken as 
facial evidence that the districts were drawn so that one party might gain 
electoral advantages over others, as in the original gerrymander;20 or in the 
2012 Florida congressional districts;21 or discriminating against racial groups, 
as in the first case of racial districting, Gomillion v. Lightfoot.22  
Compactness can be immediately informative about individual districts. If 
a district’s boundary is determined to be unusually distorted, a court or other 
analyst might then examine other characteristics of the district and neighboring 
districts, such as racial or partisan composition, to determine whether the non-
compactness might have had the effect of diluting the vote of certain groups of 
individuals in the area affected by the district. One may also determine the 
relationship between the characteristics of suspect districts and the political 
orientation of the legislature that drew the district. For example, is a 
                                                                                                                     
 18 See Young, supra note 15, at 114 n.1. 
 19 See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 489–91, 496–97 (describing the creation 
of majority-minority, non-compact districts and how they have been used to favor the 
Democratic or Republican Party). 
 20 See GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 62–77. 
 21 See generally Romo v. Detzner, No. 2012-CA-000412, 2014 WL 3797315 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. July 10, 2014) (finding that two non-compact district were impermissibly drawn to 
benefit the Republican Party), aff’d sub nom. League of Women Voters v. Detzner, 172 So. 
3d 363 (Fla. 2015). 
 22 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (holding that a challenge to 
redistricting based on racial discrimination is subject to judicial review).  
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Democratically controlled legislature more likely to create misshapen 
Republican districts because of packing of the opposition party, or misshapen 
Democratic districts to increase the number of potential Democratic districts? 
We examine the connection between the non-compactness of a district and the 
extent to which it tilts toward one of the parties, and whether that slant is a 
function of who drew the districts (a court, a commission, or a legislature). 
Throughout the extensive literature on districting and gerrymandering, several 
factors are thought to contribute to the characteristics of districts and the 
structure of representation. The most prominent of these are: the number of 
districts,23 unified government,24 population density,25 racial composition,26 
and partisanship and incumbency protection.27  
II. MEASURING COMPACTNESS 
A substantial literature considers the problem of measuring district 
compactness. Young and Niemi et al. examine a wide variety of methods to 
measure compactness.28 Here, we seek to build on Altman, who analyzes the 
historical compactness of districts in the context of districting principles and 
voting rights challenges.29 
The literature generally divides methods into several categories, including 
dispersion, which assesses the general shape and area of the district;30 
regularity of the perimeter, which penalizes districts for contorted borders;31 
and population distribution, which takes population concentration into account 
when evaluating the district’s shape.32 As our goal here is an historical 
assessment of district compactness, we are unable to consider compactness 
                                                                                                                     
 23 Young, supra note 15, at 112; see also Thomas W. Gilligan & John G. Matsusaka, 
Public Choice Principles of Redistricting, 129 PUB. CHOICE 381, 382–83 (2006). 
 24 See GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER: THE 
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 5–6, 31–65 (2002); 
see also Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in 
U.S. Congressional Elections, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 812, 812 (1999). 
 25 Chen & Rodden, supra note 13, at 242. 
 26 DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING 
AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 96–97 (1997); John N. Friedman & Richard T. 
Holden, Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
113, 116 (2008). 
 27 Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Effects of Redistricting on 
Incumbents, 11 ELECTION L.J. 490, 490–92 (2012); Richard Forgette & Glenn Platt, 
Redistricting Principles and Incumbency Protection in the U.S. Congress, 24 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 934, 939–40 (2005); Guillermo Owen & Bernard Grofman, Optimal Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 7 POL. GEOGRAPHY Q. 5, 14–15 (1988). 
 28 See generally Niemi et al., supra note 5; Young, supra note 15. 
 29 Micah Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22 
SOC. SCI. HIST. 159, 161–62 (1998). 
 30 Niemi et al., supra note 5, at 1160–64. 
 31 Id. at 1164–65. 
 32 Id. at 1165–67. 
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measures of this third category due to data unavailability. Thus, we focus on 
the area and perimeter of congressional districts to assess compactness.  
Our analysis below focuses on four key methods for measuring 
compactness.33 First, we use two measures of dispersion, Reock and the 
convex hull ratio, to examine the shape of districts. Reock compares the area 
of the district to the area of the minimum bounding circle that encloses the 
district.34 The “ideal” district is a circle, with a perfect score of “1”; a square 
has a score of “0.64.”35 The convex hull ratio uses a similar approach but 
substitutes the minimum bounding circle for the minimum bounding convex 
polygon.36 With this measure, any convex polygon is equally ideal, but 
districts with significant protrusions or curves are non-compact.37 The top half 
of Figure 2 illustrates these measures.38 
One of the drawbacks of these dispersion measures is that some states, due 
to borders or coastlines, are non-compact themselves, and as a result, some 
districts within them will receive low compactness scores, regardless of how 
the district borders are drawn. This is a particularly important problem when 
we seek to compare district compactness across states, or when we use the 
average compactness of a state plan to compare states. As a result, we 
implement an adjusted version of Reock and the convex hull ratio that 
excludes areas outside of the state’s borders from the area of the minimum 
bounding circle or convex polygon. For example, in Figure 2, the minimum 
bounding circle encloses the district, but also includes part of New Hampshire 
at the top and the Atlantic Ocean to the right of the district.39 The Reock 
measure includes these areas, but the adjusted Reock measure excludes them 
and only includes the area of state within the circle, shaded in gray. This 
method of adjusting the minimum bounding geometry is used in some state 
compactness statutes, such as those in Michigan.40 
The second set of measures examines the perimeter of the district. 
Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper measure how effectively the perimeter of a 
                                                                                                                     
 33 One future goal of this project is to calculate every feasible compactness measure 
for every district, including all measures listed in Niemi et al., supra note 5, and Young, 
supra note 15. 
 34 Ernest C. Reock, Jr., Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative 
Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 70, 71 (1961). 
 35 See Young, supra note 15, at 106. 
 36 AZAVEA, REDRAWING THE MAP ON REDISTRICTING 2010: A NATIONAL STUDY 10 
(2009), https://cdn.azavea.com/com.redistrictingthenation/pdfs/Redistricting_The_Nation_ 
White_Paper_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4ZA-FRDZ]. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See infra Figure 2. Some districts are non-contiguous due to islands or other 
geographic features. For these districts, we draw separate bounding circles or convex 
polygons for each individual feature.  
 39 See infra Figure 2. 
 40 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 3.63(c)(vii), 4.261(j) (West 2013); see also Justin 
Levitt, Michigan, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-MI.php#cri 
teria [https://perma.cc/EF3J-75AS]. 
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district captures the area of a district.41 Districts with smooth perimeters are 
more compact than those with contorted borders, and the most compact district 
possible is a circle.42 Schwartzberg measures the ratio of the perimeter of the 
district to the perimeter of a circle with the same area.43 Polsby-Popper 
measures the ratio of the area of the district to the area of a circle with the 
same perimeter.44 These two measures are closely related. As Polsby and 
Popper point out when proposing their measure, they are mathematically 
equivalent.45 However, they are often used as two separate measures of 
compactness. The bottom half of Figure 2 illustrates these two measures.46 
Like the dispersion measures, perimeter-based measures are also 
particularly sensitive to state borders. In particular, the convoluted coastlines 
of states such as Maine, Maryland, Virginia, and Louisiana produce coastal 
districts with extraordinarily low Polsby-Popper and Schwartzberg scores.47 
Furthermore, these scores are extremely sensitive to the resolution of the map. 
The more detailed the map, the greater the district perimeter. Unlike the 
dispersion measures, however, there is not an easy adjustment to correct for 
complex geography. As a result, we must be more careful when using 
perimeter-based compactness scores to ensure that non-compactness is due to 
political rather than coastal geography.  
As discussed throughout the literature, no one measure of compactness is 
optimal. Each measure has its advantages in detecting certain forms of non-
compactness and its disadvantages in missing others. For example, a spiral-
shaped district will be relatively compact using both of the dispersion 
measures, but extremely non-compact on the perimeter measures.48 A triangle 
is perfectly compact using the convex hull ratio,49 but non-compact using 
Reock. As a result, multiple criteria are desirable for assessing non-
compactness and gerrymandering.50  
A. Data 
We use the United States Congressional District Shapefiles assembled by 
Lewis et al. to measure the compactness of every congressional district from 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 348–49; Schwartzberg, supra note 17, at 445. 
 42 See Schwartzberg, supra note 17, at 444. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 348–49. 
 45 See id. at 349 n.204 (PolsbyPopper = 1(Schwartzberg
2
)). 
 46 See infra Figure 2. 
 47 See Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 349 n.206, 351. 
 48 See Young, supra note 15, at 106, 108. 
 49 See id. at 106, 110. 
 50 Paul S. Edwards & Nelson W. Polsby, Introduction: The Judicial Regulation of 
Political Processes—In Praise of Multiple Criteria, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 190, 202–03 
(1991); Niemi et al., supra note 5, at 1157. 
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the first Congress to the present.51 Lewis et al. provides separate shapefiles for 
each Congress, such that we can measure not only the districts produced 
following the decennial censuses, but also districts created through mid-decade 
redistrictings and districts that change mid-decade due to legal challenges and 
court orders.52 To measure the compactness of each district, we used ArcGIS 
and the Python module ArcPy to measure the area and perimeter for each 
district and calculate the minimum bounding circles and convex polygons (and 
the state-boundary-adjusted variants) used in our dispersion measures. These 
tools allow us to automate much of the work involved in calculating 
compactness measures, a substantial advantage over the more limited tools 
available in the 1980s and 1990s when the compactness literature was largely 
underdeveloped. Table 1 shows the distribution of each compactness measure. 
Table 1: Distribution of Compactness Measures for All Congressional 
Districts53 
      Percentile 
Measure Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Reock  0.405 0.110 0.260 0.326 0.408 0.481 0.546 
Reock Adj.  0.526 0.147 0.340 0.424 0.518 0.622 0.719 
Convex Hull 
Ratio  
0.760 0.106 0.620 0.697 0.768 0.840 0.889 
Convex Hull 
Ratio Adj.  
0.809 0.107 0.664 0.746 0.822 0.888 0.935 
Polsby-
Popper  
0.293 0.158 0.080 0.178 0.287 0.400 0.511 
Schwartzberg  2.381 1.875 1.399 1.580 1.866 2.369 3.532 
 
While most congressional districts now are defined every ten years, 
historically many districts persisted with the same boundaries for much longer 
periods, while others might only be used for one or two congresses as a result 
of mid-cycle redistricting or voting rights litigation.54 From 1789 through 
2013, 9,276 different districts have been used over a total of 34,996 district-
Congresses.55 However, of these 9,276 different districts, many are close 
variants of each other, as some districts changed minimally following 
redistricting. We use “district-Congress” as the unit of analysis. By using 
                                                                                                                     
 51 See generally Jeffrey B. Lewis et al., United States Congressional District 
Shapefiles, UCLA DEP’T POL. SCI., http://cdmaps.polisci.ucla.edu/ [https://perma.cc/3RTU-
KRMK]. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Statistics are based on 34,996 observations. Each observation is a district-Congress. 
Excludes single-district states. 
 54 See LEVITT, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 55 These counts exclude at-large districts. Multi-member districts are counted as 
single districts.  
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“district-Congress” instead of “district,” districts that are used for longer time 
periods are weighted more heavily than districts that are used for a single 
Congress.56 
III. DISTRICT-LEVEL RESULTS 
We begin with the original gerrymander, our baseline for assessing district 
compactness. While the origin of the Gerrymander is well known, it is often 
incorrectly described as a congressional district instead of a state senate 
district. The original gerrymander, upon which the famous cartoon is based, 
was a Massachusetts Senate district.57 Figure 1 shows the infamous 
gerrymander cartoon, the actual Massachusetts Senate district, and the Second 
Congressional district, which is often confused with the original gerrymander. 
The only difference between the original gerrymander and the congressional 
district is the town of Salisbury, the “head” of the gerrymander.58 While the 
original gerrymander is not a congressional district, we will use it, rather than 
the “headless” congressional district, as our baseline due to its well identifiable 
shape and its recognition as an effective political gerrymander.59 
  
                                                                                                                     
 56 Additionally, using “district” as the observation would over-represent districts that 
change very slightly over time, because each would appear as a separate observation. This 
choice also keeps the number of observations constant when we analyze the data by 
Congress. The results are very similar when we use the “district-Congress” unit as the unit 
of observation instead.  
 57 See GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 16–18. 
 58 See id. 
 59 As discussed in id. at 23–61, the original gerrymander is not in fact the first 
political gerrymander in the United States. Several congressional and state legislative 
districts were drawn prior to the original gerrymander that we would consider to be 
gerrymanders, and even some colonial districts were gerrymandered as well.  
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Figure 1: The Original Gerrymander 
   
“The Gerry-mander. A 
new species of 
Monster, which 
appeared in Essex South 
District in January 
last.”60  
Actual map of the 
original gerrymander, a 
Massachusetts State 
Senate district drawn in 
1812.  
Map of the 
Massachusetts Second 
Congressional district, 
Thirteenth Congress. 
 
We use this original gerrymander as a standard by which we assess all 
other districts. Rather than compare districts to some ideal geometry, whether 
a circle, square, or other desirable shape, we compare districts to this 
gerrymandered (by definition) shape. By standardizing our compactness 
measurements relative to the original gerrymander, we are able to analyze 
different measures using a common scale and shared interpretation. While any 
district (or shape) could be selected as a standard, we believe that the original 
gerrymander is an extremely effective choice. As a deliberate, unambiguous, 
and successful political gerrymander,61 the original gerrymander offers a 
useful and interpretable standard: any district worse than the original 
gerrymander across some set of compactness measures should be considered 
gerrymandered as well. The use of the phrase “some set of compactness 
measures,” reflects that multiple criteria are desirable for assessing district 
compactness. Districts that are bad on one measure may be good on others. 
However, compactness measures generally correlate, and a district that scores 
poorly on a number of different measures is a likely gerrymander. Figure 2 
illustrates the compactness of the original gerrymander using the Reock, 
convex hull ratio (and their adjusted variants), Polsby-Popper, and 
Schwartzberg measures. Table 2 reports the raw scores for the original 
gerrymander for each measure.62 
  
                                                                                                                     
 60 The Gerry-Mander, BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 26, 1812.  
 61 GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 62–77. 
 62 See infra Table 2. 
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Figure 2: Illustrations of Compactness Measures Using the Original 
Gerrymander 
Reock Convex Hull 
  
Polsby-Popper Schwartzberg 
 
 
 
The top two maps illustrate measures of dispersion: Reock and convex 
hull ratio. They are defined as the ratio of the area of the district to the area of 
the bounding geometry.63 The circle/polygon outline defines this geometry. 
The light gray area within these outlines defines the area of the bounding 
geometry that is within the borders of the state. This area is used in the 
adjusted measures. The bottom two maps illustrate measures of perimeter. 
Polsby-Popper is the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle with the 
same perimeter.64 Schwartzberg is the ratio of the perimeter of the district to 
the perimeter of a circle with the same area.65 
                                                                                                                     
 63 Reock, supra note 34, at 71; see also Young, supra note 15, at 110. 
 64 Polsby & Popper, supra note 6, at 348–49. 
 65 See Schwartzberg, supra note 17, at 444. 
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Table 2: Compactness Score for the Original Gerrymander 
Measure Score 
Reock  0.289 
Reock Adjusted  0.396 
Convex Hull Ratio  0.494 
Convex Hull Ratio Adj.  0.539 
Polsby-Popper  0.095 
Schwartzberg  3.247 
 
Using the compactness results for the original gerrymander, we 
standardize the results for all other districts by dividing the district’s result by 
the compactness score of the original gerrymander.66 The higher the score, the 
less compact (the more non-compact) the district. A score less than “1” means 
that the district is more compact than the original gerrymander on that 
measure, while scores greater than “1” mean the district is less compact. 
Table 3 reports the standardized distributions for each measure. This allows 
for better interpretability between measures than in Table 1. For example, the 
average district is 16% better than the original gerrymander using Reock, but 
52% better using the convex hull ratio. All of the subsequent analyses of 
compactness use these standardized measures.  
Table 3: Distribution of Compactness Measures for All Congressional 
Districts, Standardized Measures67 
      Percentile 
Measure Mean SD 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 
Reock  0.838 0.155 0.638 0.730 0.833 0.948 1.042 
Reock Adj.  0.785 0.244 0.466 0.626 0.798 0.954 1.092 
Convex Hull 
Ratio  
0.474 0.210 0.219 0.317 0.458 0.598 0.751 
Convex Hull 
Ratio Adj.  
0.414 0.231 0.141 0.243 0.386 0.550 0.730 
Polsby-
Popper  
0.781 0.175 0.540 0.662 0.788 0.908 1.016 
Schwartzberg  0.699 0.237 0.412 0.531 0.671 0.835 1.036 
                                                                                                                     
 66 For measures such as Schwartzberg, where higher scores indicate lower 
compactness, we divide the score of the original gerrymander by the district’s score.  
 67 Statistics are based on 34,996 observations. Each observation is a district-Congress. 
Excludes single-district states. Measures are standardized such that the original 
gerrymander receives a score of “1” on each measure. For all measures, a higher score 
corresponds to lower compactness (higher non-compactness). 
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A. Historical Trends in Compactness  
District compactness has changed significantly over the history of 
Congress. Before Baker v. Carr,68 congressional districts rarely had equal 
populations, and boundaries were often drawn using town or county lines.69 
However, as the original gerrymander illustrates, even districts drawn using 
town and county lines can be significantly non-compact. Figure 3 plots the 
distribution of district compactness by Congress using the Reock adjusted, 
convex hull ratio adjusted, and Polsby-Popper measures. In both dispersion-
based measures, non-compactness is increasing over time. These plots reveal 
an interesting pattern. While the bad districts continue to get worse, the entire 
distribution is changing as well. The entire distribution, not just the top 
percentiles, is becoming less compact than in the past. 
Figure 3: Historical Trends in District Compactness 
Reock (Adjusted)  
 
Convex Hull Ratio (Adjusted) 
 
                                                                                                                     
 68 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing the Court’s 
jurisdiction over electoral apportionment claims). 
 69 See Altman, supra note 29, at 187. 
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Polsby-Popper 
 
 
These graphs plot the distribution of each compactness measure by 
Congress. Each line shows how the specified percentile changes over time. 
Higher scores correspond to less compact districts. In the last fifty years, 
districts are significantly less compact than in the past. 
The plot of Polsby-Popper scores over time tells a different story. The 
ninetieth percentile of districts were worse in the earliest Congresses than they 
are in the present. Furthermore, there is a slight general trend in the first fifty 
years towards increasing compactness. This is driven not by substantive 
changes in how districts are drawn, but by changes in the composition of the 
country. As the nation expanded westward, the new states themselves were 
generally more compact than the original colonies and earliest additional states 
because they lacked complex coastlines. Additionally, as the number of 
districts increased, the effect of coastal districts in Massachusetts/Maine, 
Virginia, Maryland, and elsewhere on average compactness diminished. 
Within the last fifty years, however, a similar trend is evident on this measure 
as in the others—there is an increase in non-compactness throughout most of 
the distribution. This shift, however, is largest among the bottom of the 
distribution. This is likely due to the fact that the very worst districts—the 
aforementioned coastal districts—remain relatively constant across the entire 
time period. However, as with the other two measures, even the best districts 
are getting less compact. 
While the trend generally persists across the entire time period, it is 
strongest in recent decades. Table 4 reports averages for each standardized 
measure for three time periods: 1941–1970 (districts drawn before Wesberry v. 
Sanders70 took effect), 1971–2000 (districts drawn before Shaw v. Reno71 took 
effect), and 2001–2013 (districts drawn after Shaw v. Reno72). Across all 
                                                                                                                     
 70 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1964) (establishing the doctrine of one 
person, one vote). 
 71 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (recognizing a racial discrimination 
claim based on an “extremely irregular” district shape). 
 72 See id. 
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measures, non-compactness has increased, and the differences between these 
averages are highly significant for all time periods and measures. 
Table 4: Compactness by Era73 
Time Period Reock Convex Hull Polsby-Popper 
1942–1971 
n = 6356 
0.773 
-0.003 
0.386 
-0.003 
0.763 
-0.002 
1972–2001 
n = 6430 
0.823 
-0.003 
0.502 
-0.003 
0.834 
-0.002 
2002–2013 
n = 2568 
0.887 
-0.005 
0.593 
-0.006 
0.859 
-0.002 
B. Using the Standard to Identify Gerrymandered Districts  
In this Part we use the standard of the original gerrymander to identify 
potentially gerrymandered districts. Rather than use the compactness 
measurements of the original gerrymander to standardize the measurements 
for all other districts, we use the original gerrymander’s compactness scores as 
a cutoff. Figure 4 plots the percentage of districts in each congress with worse 
scores than the original gerrymander for Reock (adjusted), the convex hull 
ratio (adjusted), and Polsby-Popper. All three measures generally correlate, 
with the exception of Polsby-Popper in the first fifty years.74 In the last fifty 
years, we see a substantial increase in the percentage of districts worse than 
the original gerrymander under all three measures. 
                                                                                                                     
 73 Mean and standard distribution of standardized Reock, convex hull ratio, and 
Polsby-Popper scores for congressional districts by time period. From each time period to 
the next, the difference in means for each measure are significant at p < .01.  
 74 See supra Part III.A. 
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Figure 4: Districts Less Compact than the Standard75 
 
Table 5 reports the number and percentage of all congressional districts 
that are worse than the original gerrymander. Overall, 28% of all 
congressional districts are less compact than the original gerrymander on at 
least one of our three measures, but only 1% are worse on all three of the 
compactness measures used in this Article. This highlights the importance of 
using multiple criteria to assess non-compactness. Of the districts that are 
worse on one measure, only 11% are worse on a second measure. 
Table 5: Non-Compact Districts by Number of Measures Non-Compact76 
All Districts, 1789–2013 
Number of Measures N % Number of Measures N % 
All measures (3)  300 0.009  All measures (3)  300 0.009 
2 or more  1097 0.031  Exactly 2  797 0.023 
1 or more  9925 0.284  Exactly 1  8828 0.252 
1973–2013 
Number of Measures N % Number of Measures N % 
All measures (3)  276 0.031  All measures (3)  276 0.031 
2 or more  687 0.076  Exactly 2  411 0.046 
1 or more  3123 0.347  Exactly 1  2436 0.271 
 
Table 6 divides the non-compactness results in Table 5 by measure.77 The 
second column in Table 6 gives the number and percentage of districts that are 
worse than the original gerrymander on each of the three measures. The set of 
columns on the right then show the percentage of these districts that are also 
                                                                                                                     
 75 Each line plots the percentage of districts in each Congress that are worse than the 
original gerrymander (standardized score greater than “1”) for the specified measure. 
CH=Convex hull ratio; PP=Polsby-Popper. 
 76 Each observation is a unique district-Congress. 1789–2013: n = 34,996; 1973–
2013: n = 8,998.  
 77 See infra Figure 6. 
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worse on the other measures. For example, 19% of all districts are worse than 
the original gerrymander using Reock, but of these districts only 9% are also 
worse using the convex hull ratio. While a substantial percentage of districts 
are worse than the original gerrymander under Reock (19%) and Polsby-
Popper (12%), only 2% of districts are worse using the convex hull ratio. The 
original gerrymander is relatively non-compact on all three measures, but it is 
extremely non-compact using the convex hull ratio due to the sharp angle of 
the “neck” of the gerrymander.78 The original gerrymander also surrounds an 
extremely compact district, such that the state-boundary adjustment does little 
to improve its convex hull ratio.79 Thus, the original gerrymander is a hard 
standard to exceed using convex hull ration. As Figure 4 shows, most (and 
sometimes all) districts were more compact on this measure than the original 
gerrymander through the 1950s.80 Since then, there has been a significant rise 
of non-compactness on this measure.81 Modern district shapes thus 
increasingly deviate from convex polygons compared to the past. 
Table 6: Percentage of Congressional Districts Worse than Original 
Gerrymander, by Compactness Measure82 
  
Measure 
Worse than 
Gerrymander 
Within-group 
Reock CH PP 
Reock Adj. 
 
0.191 
(6671) 
--- 
0.087 
(581) 
0.122 
(812) 
Convex Hull 
Ratio Adj.  
0.017 
(591) 
0.983 
(581) 
--- 
0.514 
(304) 
Polsby-Popper 
  
0.116 
(4060) 
0.2 
(812) 
0.075 
(304) 
--- 
Worse on Any 
Measure  
0.284 
(9925) 
0.672 
(6671) 
0.06 
(591) 
0.409 
(4060) 
C. The Most Gerrymandered Districts in U.S. History 
Using our three compactness measures together, we define the most 
gerrymandered districts as those that are worse than the original gerrymander 
on all three measures. There are 300 such district-Congresses, representing 
                                                                                                                     
 78 See supra Table 2. 
 79 See supra Figure 1. 
 80 See supra Figure 4. 
 81 See supra Figure 4. 
 82 The second column gives the percentages and numbers (below) of congressional 
districts less compact than the original gerrymander by the measure listed in the first 
column. The three columns on the right give the percentages and numbers (below) of 
districts less compact than the original gerrymander by compactness measure within the 
group that are less compact by the measure in the first column. Each observation is a 
unique district-Congress, n = 34,996.  
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109 unique districts. Figure 5 displays some of these districts.83 The set of the 
most gerrymandered districts includes some well-known examples of 
gerrymandering, such as the Illinois fourth “earmuffs”84 and the Maryland 
third “pinwheel,”85 but it also includes some less recognized gerrymanders 
including the Maryland ninth district. Most of the 109 districts that are worse 
than the original gerrymander on all three measures are recent; only sixteen of 
the districts were drawn before the 103rd Congress. New York (district 18), 
Florida (district 14), California (district 13), and Texas (district 12) appear on 
the list the most times, and Florida has the highest percentage of district-
Congresses on the list; 6% of all district-Congresses in Florida are less 
compact on all three measures than the original gerrymander.  
                                                                                                                     
 83 See supra Figure 5. 
 84 See Rick Pearson, Federal Court Upholds Illinois Congressional Map, CHI. TRIB. 
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-12-16/news/ct-met-congress-map-court-
20111216_1_congressional-map-earmuff-shaped-new-map [https://perma.cc/FC3N-HFFT].  
 85 See Opinion, Getting Rid of Redistricting’s Snakes, Earmuffs and Pterodactyls, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/getting-rid-of-
redistrictings-snakes-earmuffs-and-pterodactyls/2012/10/26/81ed183e-1dca-11e2-ba31-
3083ca97c314_story.html?utm_term=.b72c4036397c [https://perma.cc/T7QD-G4BL]. 
2016] STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE GERRYMANDER 759 
Figure 5: Examples of Highly-Gerrymandered Districts 
 
D. Compactness and Competition  
The incidence of highly non-compact congressional districts has increased 
over the past fifty years. That trend may be worrisome in and of itself, but it 
might also be indicative of deeper changes in our politics. Geographic non-
compactness of districts has long been thought to signal political manipulation 
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to favor one party over another, for example.86 Certainly that is the story of 
Elbridge Gerry’s handiwork in 1811.87 In this Part, we present a first look at 
the connection between non-compactness and partisanship using the measures 
developed here.  
We examine the relationship between partisanship and non-compactness at 
the individual district level. Using U.S. House election data from 1972 to 
2008, we find that Democratic vote share is highly correlated with district non-
compactness. We focus on the post-1970 period to set aside the problem of 
unequal population. Table 7 presents results from regressions of Democratic 
vote share in congressional elections on our measures of compactness. The 
data reveals that there is a strong relationship between the performance of 
Democratic candidates and the non-compactness of the district. The more 
Democratic the district, the less compact the district. 
Table 7: Regressions of Democratic Vote Share on Non-Compactness88 
  
(1) 
Reock 
(2) 
CH 
(3) 
P-P 
(4) 
Reock 
(5) 
CH 
(6) 
P-P 
Dem. vote % 
 
0.122* 
(-0.012) 
0.121* 
(-0.010) 
0.0624* 
(-0.006) 
0.195* 
(-0.017) 
0.209* 
(-0.015) 
0.108* 
(-0.009) 
Observations  7981 7981 7981 6912 6912 6912 
R-squared  0.252 0.243 0.343 0.267 0.259 0.361 
Uncontested 
Elections  
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 
There are many possible explanations for this regularity. The geographic 
distribution of partisans is one possibility.89 Chen and Rodden argue that there 
is a natural tendency for Democrats to have less compact districts because they 
are more heavily concentrated in urban areas.90 This can produce a partisan 
                                                                                                                     
 86 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 581. 
 87 See GRIFFITH, supra note 9, at 62–77. 
 88 This table displays OLS results from regressing Democratic vote share in 
congressional elections on standardized measures of district compactness, using state-
congress fixed effects. Positive coefficients indicate an increase in non-compactness. 
Includes U.S. House general election results from 1972–2008. The first three models 
include all elections; the last three exclude uncontested races. At-large elections are 
excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses; * p<0.01. 
 89 Chen & Rodden, supra note 13, at 240. 
 90 Id. at 262–64. 
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bias at the state level in favor of Republicans.91 The creation of majority-
minority districts under the Voting Rights Act is another possibility.92 The 
method of redistricting (state legislature, commission, or courts) may also play 
a role in the creation of non-compact Democratic districts.93 Non-compact 
districts may be the product of Democratic gerrymanders, where Democratic 
state legislatures have drawn convoluted lines to benefit themselves.94 In other 
cases, non-compact Democratic districts may be drawn in Republican 
gerrymanders, where Democrats are packed into serpentine districts to reduce 
their electoral influence in neighboring districts.95  
Explaining the origins of this relationship awaits further investigation. 
Whatever the causes of the correlation between Democratic vote share and 
non-compactness of districts, the existence of such a relationship reveals that 
non-compactness can be indicative of political concerns and electoral 
outcomes. As a legal criterion, then, insistence on compactness may have 
important implications for the political fairness of legislative districts, in 
individual and whole plans.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The geographic configuration of legislative districts is one of the most 
immediate tests of the integrity of the districting process: we know a 
gerrymander when we see it. Even though people commonly conjecture such a 
casual standard, it is evident that state legislators, courts, and others involved 
in the districting process have struggled to establish clear guidelines for the 
geographic compactness of districts. We have proposed one such standard, the 
configuration of the original gerrymander. The everyday meaning of the term 
gerrymander and the manipulations that lie behind it are embodied in the 
geographic features of the map itself. By measuring those features and 
applying them to the history of all congressional districts, much can be learned 
about the integrity of the districting process in the United States and how it has 
changed.  
We do not intend this as a bright-line standard that any court or legislature 
could adopt. Rather it serves as a guide post, a marker that should raise 
concerns. There may be other lower or higher thresholds, perhaps derived 
from other districts, that have been accepted in a legal setting or in common 
                                                                                                                     
 91 Id. 
 92 See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 489–91 (describing North Carolina’s 
creation of two majority-minority districts, one “with a total population of 56.63% black 
and a voting-age population of 53.34% black” in order to pass VRA preclearance in the 
1990s). 
 93 Jamie L. Carson et al., Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral 
Competition, 1972–2012, 14 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 165, 171 (2014). 
 94 See generally LEVITT, supra note 4, at 57–60 (explaining the concept of partisan 
gerrymandering). 
 95 See id. 
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parlance as examples of districting gone awry. Our purpose has been to lay 
down one such marker—to our thinking the most obvious one—and to see 
where it leads.  
Importantly, it appears that the geographic integrity of congressional 
districts has worsened in the United States since the 1960s.96 This certainly fits 
the common perception and much popular writing on the matter. But it is a 
social scientific question as to why that worsening has occurred. Was it the 
one-person-one-vote rule? The Voting Rights Act? The increased involvement 
of the courts? It is also an open question as to what the increasing non-
compactness of congressional districts indicates. Is this a sign that 
representation is getting worse because there is increased manipulation of 
districts to favor one party over another? Has the creation of majority-minority 
districts contributed to non-compactness, and if so, in what respects has that 
improved or distorted representation? These are important, unanswered 
questions, and certainly the next step in the quest to understand how the 
structure of representation has changed in the United States over the course of 
its history.  
Whatever the answer to these questions, though, maintaining geographic 
compactness of districts has long been embraced as a traditional districting 
principle. Over the arc of U.S. history there was a steady state in the 
distribution of compactness and non-compactness, but that steady state was 
disrupted in the 1960s. The political process today is engaged in a protracted 
struggle to find a new balance among the various principles that guide 
districting, including geographic integrity. The patterns found here indicate a 
steady move away from geographic compactness as such a principle. There 
may be a reassertion of this criterion, as has been seen in states like Florida 
and in some recent federal court cases (such as Page v. Virginia Board of 
Elections97), or the nation may shift toward a different conception of 
representation in which compactness, although a standard, is valued little. The 
historical trajectory certainly suggests that we are on the latter path. It is up to 
the legislatures and the courts in the United States to determine whether 
geography will remain a meaningful basis for representation, and if so, what 
will be the criterion for representation of geographic areas in the United States.  
                                                                                                                     
 96 See supra Figure 4. 
 97 See Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 58 F. Supp. 3d 533, 550 (E.D. Va. 2014) 
(considering a district’s highly irregular shape as evidence of racial gerrymandering), 
vacated sub nom. Cantor v. Personhuballah, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015). 
